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Oh, the places you’ll go!  There is fun to be done! 
There are points to be scored.  There are games to be won. 
And the magical things you can do with that ball 
will make you the winning-est winner of all. 
Fame!  You’ll be famous as famous can be, 
with the whole wide world watching you win on TV. 
. . . 
You’ll get mixed up, of course, 
as you already know. 
You’ll get mixed up 
with many strange birds as you go. 
So be sure when you step. 
Step with care and great tact 
and remember that Life’s 
a Great Balancing Act. 
Just never forget to be dexterous and deft. 
And never mix up your right foot with your left.1 
INTRODUCTION 
International litigation is fraught with procedural issues, from 
choice of forum and choice of law to forum non conveniens, the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, anti-suit injunctions, and of 
course, recognition of foreign judgments.  To further complicate 
things, as the Chevron-Ecuador story will demonstrate, as soon as one 
of those procedural issues crops up, the rest will inevitably follow. 
Indeed, international litigation can become incredibly complicated 
and drawn out, at great cost to all parties—particularly when there 
are parallel proceedings.2  The variety and utility of procedural 
devices available when a dispute spans multiple countries creates 
greater opportunity for abuse.  If, for example, one forum will not 
enforce a judgment that a litigant has obtained in a different 
jurisdiction, that litigant (the judgment-creditor) could try to enforce 
that judgment in a different forum where the defendant (the 
judgment-debtor) may have assets.  This practice forces the 
judgment-debtor to defend in multiple places.  Likewise, defendants 
can use tools like forum non conveniens or parallel proceedings to 
drag out the litigation or force the plaintiff into a quick settlement.3  
																																																																																																																																
 1. DR. SEUSS, OH, THE PLACES YOU’LL GO! (1990). 
 2. Indeed, parallel proceedings are not uncommon in international litigation.  
See Walter W. Heiser, Using Anti-Suit Injunctions to Prevent Interdictory Actions 
and to Enforce Choice of Court Agreements, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 855, 855. 
 3. See id. at 859. 
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The presence of multiple potential fora and complicated questions of 
choice of law or recognition of foreign judgments create great 
potential for litigants to be procedurally abusive—particularly when a 
potentially unfair judgment is involved and the plaintiff attempts to 
enforce it by any means possible. 
The infamous Chevron-Ecuador litigation presents many of the 
procedural issues that arise in international disputes.  During that 
litigation, a class of plaintiffs from the Lago Agrio region  (the 
judgment-creditors) obtained a multi-billion dollar money judgment 
in the Republic of Ecuador (ROE) against Chevron (the judgment-
debtor), and eventually attempted to enforce that judgment in fora 
around the world.4  Chevron brought an action in the Southern 
District of New York against the judgment-creditor seeking, among 
other things, a preliminary injunction principally to bar enforcement 
of the judgment outside of the ROE.5  Various common law tort and 
RICO claims created the gravamen of the lawsuit, providing the basis 
for jurisdiction over all the parties and, hence, the injunction.  Judge 
Kaplan granted Chevron’s request for a worldwide injunction against 
the judgment-creditors pursuant to the anti-suit injunction analysis 
articulated in China Trade & Development Corp. v. Choong Yong.6  
The Second Circuit reversed that judgment in Chevron Corp. v. 
Naranjo, concluding that China Trade’s anti-suit injunction standard 
should not apply.7  The Second Circuit instead asserted that the 
requested relief was an anti-enforcement injunction, and invoked 
New York’s version of the 1962 Uniform Foreign Country Judgments 
Recognition Act (the Recognition Act).8  The Second Circuit 
concluded that a judgment-debtor could not affirmatively bring an 
anti-enforcement action against a judgment-creditor when the 
judgment-creditor has not yet tried to collect on that judgment in the 
United States, despite declaring its intentions to do so in fora outside 
the United States9 
																																																																																																																																
 4. See infra note 79. 
 5. See Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 594, 625–26. 
 6. Id. at 648 (citing China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 
33 (2d. Cir. 1987)). 
 7. Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 
S. Ct. 423 (2012). 
 8. Id.; see also UNIF. FOREIGN-MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 
U.L.A. 261 (1962 & Supp. 2006) [hereinafter RECOGNITION ACT], available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/foreign%20money%20judgments%20recog
nition/ufmjra%20final%20act.pdf. 
 9. See generally Naranjo. 667 F.3d at 232. 
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In reaching its conclusion, the Second Circuit distinguished the 
facts in Naranjo from those in a similar case, Shell Oil Co. v. Franco.10  
In Shell Oil, the Central District of California issued a declaration of 
non-enforceability under the DJA and California’s codification of the 
Recognition Act before the judgment-creditor had technically sought 
enforcement in California,11 albeit because the judgment-creditor had 
named the wrong defendant in its prior enforcement action in 
California.12  The judgment-debtors claimed that the relevant 
Nicaraguan judgment would be unenforceable under U.S. law 
because the Nicaraguan judicial system lacks impartial tribunals13 and 
sufficient due process procedures, and the forum lacked personal 
jurisdiction—each of which is mandatory grounds for non-recognition 
under California’s version of the Recognition Act.14 
Although the court in Shell Oil only granted declaratory relief 
against enforcement within the United States, and did not attempt to 
prevent the judgment-creditors from enforcing the judgment in other 
countries, the decision is still informative; Shell Oil suggests that the 
Second Circuit may have understated its ability to issue declaratory 
relief against enforcement of the Ecuadorian judgment—at least 
within the United States. 
This problem, particularly as posited by the court in Chevron Corp. 
v. Donziger, raises a number of preliminary questions.  What kind of 
injunction was Chevron seeking, exactly?  Was it an anti-enforcement 
injunction (as the Second Circuit calls it) that should be evaluated in 
light of the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition 
Act?  Was it an anti-suit injunction that should be addressed in 
relation to the existing circuit split on anti-suit injunctions?  
Preemptive declaratory non-enforcement suits have also been 
addressed in terms of ripeness, at least in the libel tourism context,15 
adding to the complexity of U.S. judgment recognition law.  Hence, is 
a preemptive action like the preliminary injunction in Donziger 
simply unripe, and therefore inadmissible in federal court?  Cases like 
																																																																																																																																
 10. See id. at 240–41; see also Shell Oil Co. v. Franco (Shell Oil II), No. CV 03-
8846 NM (PJWx), 2005 WL 6184247 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2005). 
 11. Shell Oil II, 2005 WL 6184247, at *3. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at *1. 
 14. Id. at *6.  Shell Oil made other claims in its defense, which included lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction (dismissed), and that enforcement of the judgment would 
be repugnant to public policy. See Shell Oil Co. v. Franco (Shell Oil I), No. CV 03–
8846 NM (PJWx), 2004 WL 5615656, at *11–13 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2004). 
 15. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Lingue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme (Yahoo! 
III), 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
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Yahoo! Inc. v. La Lingue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme, for 
example, have looked at actions for a declaratory judgment of non-
enforcement occurring before a judgment-creditor tries to enforce a 
foreign judgment in the United States in terms of ripeness.16  
Although dismissing the action for lack of ripeness does nothing to 
solve the underlying problem, perhaps it is a threshold inquiry that 
courts should adopt before proceeding to the merits of the case. 
This Note addresses whether a U.S. court can provide a remedy to 
preclude aggressive, multi-national enforcement of foreign money 
judgments against a U.S. party.  Assuming the foreign money 
judgment in question is unenforceable under U.S. judgment 
recognition law, if a judgment-creditor tries to enforce the judgment 
in the United States, the U.S. judgment-debtor can assert one of 
many defenses, depending on whether the relevant jurisdiction has 
codified the Recognition Act or the updated 2005 version (the 2005 
Recognition Act).17  The bigger problem, however, concerns whether 
U.S. courts can prevent a judgment-creditor from initiating 
enforcement actions all over the globe, forcing the judgment-debtor 
to defend in multiple jurisdictions—and possibly forcing the 
judgment-debtor to settle, if only to put an end to the aggressive 
enforcement tactics.  This problem will be addressed in the context of 
the Chevron-Ecuador dispute. 
Generally speaking, this Note’s discussion has four layers of legal 
analysis: the Recognition Act—specifically, whether defenses to 
recognition may be used affirmatively to support injunctions; the 
relevance of the long-existent circuit split over how a court should 
decide whether to issue an anti-suit injunction; the reach of the DJA; 
and ripeness.  This Note also focuses on each option’s policy 
implications and impact on practitioners.  It then discusses whether 
such an injunction is really the remedy that a judgment-debtor like 
Chevron seeks, or if there is another way a U.S. court can prevent 
abusive multi-fora litigation—either in the context of the Chevron-
Ecuador litigation specifically, or international litigation in general.  
Indeed, aside from the lack of clarity regarding how a court should 
rule in an action like Donziger, if none of the arguments that Chevron 
made are viable, then the question becomes whether there is any 
remedy courts can provide to litigants in their circumstances.  If so, 
																																																																																																																																
 16. See id. at 1211–23. 
 17. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 
U.L.A. pt. II 2007 Supp. pt. 5 (2005 & Supp. 2007) [hereinafter 2005 RECOGNITION 
ACT], available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/foreign%20country%20 
money%20judgments%20recognition/ufcmjra_final_05.pdf. 
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then one might also ask exactly how, or if, they should provide that 
remedy at all.  This Note therefore examines the procedural routes 
that Chevron attempted to take, whether any of them are viable, and 
if not, propose an alternative remedy. 
Part I discusses the origins of the Chevron-Ecuador litigation, 
starting with the activity in Ecuador that led to Ecuadorian plaintiffs’ 
initial class action lawsuit.  Part I also briefly outlines the relevant 
Southern District of New York and Second Circuit holdings in this 
litigation. 
Part II summarizes the relevant law in this area, including (1) the 
recognition of foreign-country judgments in the United States, 
particularly the Recognition Act; (2) the standards for granting anti-
suit injunctions; (3) the factors courts balance in deciding whether to 
grant a declaratory judgment under the DJA; and (4) ripeness 
requirements in federal courts. 
Part III outlines the decisions of the courts in Donziger and 
Naranjo in more detail, and summarizes the conflict between the 
district court and the Court of Appeals in the Chevron-Ecuador cases.  
Part III evaluates the relevance of the Ninth Circuit’s holdings in 
Shell Oil and Yahoo!  Part III also outlines the problems created by 
the Second Circuit’s holding in Naranjo, and considers whether 
another standard should have been applied. 
Finally, Part IV discusses the problems the Naranjo decision 
creates and evaluates the implications of each possible approach 
courts could take when facing these circumstances.  Part IV agrees 
that the Recognition Act by itself does not create an affirmative cause 
of action, but concludes that a federal district court can still enjoin 
parties from enforcing a judgment if they can prove that the original 
proceedings were fraudulent and the judgment would be 
unenforceable under the Recognition Act—at least within the United 
States.  Part IV additionally suggests that the Second Circuit should 
adopt a new test, loosely based on the China Trade factors, to 
determine whether a court may issue an anti-enforcement injunction 
enjoining a party from enforcing an unfair judgment outside the 
United States—provided that the court has personal jurisdiction over 
all the parties in question. 
I.  ORIGINS OF THE CHEVRON-ECUADOR LITIGATION 
The ongoing Chevron-Ecuadorian litigation vividly illustrates the 
problems courts face when deciding whether to recognize and enforce 
substantial (and possibly unfair) foreign judgments, dismiss the action 
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altogether, or issue an injunction of some kind.  The history of this 
litigation is both long and notorious. 
Texaco, Inc. and its subsidiary, Texaco Petroleum (TexPet), first 
engaged in oil exploration and drilling in the Ecuadorian Amazon’s 
Oriente region from 1964 to 1992.18  The ROE, through a state-owned 
oil agency known as Petroecuador, also participated in the venture, 
obtaining a twenty-five percent share in a Consortium with TexPet 
and Gulf Oil that was originally formed in 1965.19  Petroecuador 
bought Gulf Oil’s share and became a majority stakeholder in the 
Consortium in 1974.20  Petroecuador eventually took over TexPet’s 
interests in the Consortium as well, acquiring complete control over 
the Consortium in 1992.21  The oil companies allegedly polluted the 
area, naturally angering the indigenous population, and dooming both 
parties to a long, tiresome, and inevitably costly road through a 
labyrinth of various court systems—both foreign and American. 
In 1994, after the ROE bought TexPet out of the Consortium, a 
group of Ecuadorian plaintiffs (the Aguinda plaintiffs) brought a 
putative class action against Texaco in the Southern District of New 
York, alleging that TexPet had committed several environmental 
abuses, including improper disposal of hazardous waste and 
destruction of tropical rainforests.22  A collection of Peruvian 
plaintiffs, living downstream from the Aguinda plaintiffs, also brought 
a similar putative class action against Texaco.23  Both complaints 
alleged that TexPet’s operations in Ecuador between 1964 and 1992 
severely polluted the rain forests and rivers in Ecuador and Peru, and 
that the subsidiary’s actions in Ecuador were controlled by Texaco’s 
operations in the United States.24 
While the litigation in New York was pending, TexPet signed a 
settlement agreement with the ROE, in which TexPet agreed to 
“perform specified remedial environmental work in exchange for a 
																																																																																																																																
 18. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. (Aguinda II), 303 F.3d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527 (VLB), 1994 WL 142006, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994). 
 23. Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 155 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 24. Aguinda II, 303 F.3d at 473.  A separate class action was also brought in 
Texas, and was quickly dismissed by the Texas federal court on the grounds of forum 
non conveniens and international comity. Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61 
(S.D. Tex. 1994). 
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release of claims by [the Republic of Ecuador].”25  The settlement 
covered any and all claims the ROE or Petroecuador would have 
against Texaco, TexPet, and related companies in connection with the 
Consortium.26  The Ecuadorian government also stated that all the 
Aguinda plaintiffs’ claims belonged to the ROE, presumably with the 
intention of putting an end to the Aguinda litigation.27  Three years 
later, the ROE entered into an agreement stating that Texaco had 
complied with the original settlement’s terms, and released TexPet 
and related companies from liability “for items related to the 
obligations assumed by TexPet in the Settlement.”28 
Concerned that the ROE was an indispensable party under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 19, which could have led to the dismissal of 
the entire action due to sovereign immunity, the Aguinda plaintiffs 
also entered into negotiations with the Ecuadorian government.29  
Texaco had sought dismissal on the grounds that “Ecuadorian 
governmental activity is inextricably intertwined in the events at 
issue, thus making [the government of Ecuador and its agencies] 
indispensable parties under [Rule] 19 which have not been joined, 
and cannot be joined because of sovereign immunity.”30  At the 
conclusion of these negotiations, the Aguinda plaintiffs agreed to 
refrain from making claims against the Ecuadorian government and 
its affiliates (including Petroecuador), and to refrain from collecting 
any amount the court might award to Texaco against the Ecuadorian 
government and its affiliates.31 
Meanwhile, back in the Southern District of New York, Judge 
Rakoff granted Texaco’s motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non 
conveniens and international comity.32  The Court also found the 
existence of an independently sufficient ground for dismissal—
namely, failure to join an indispensible party under Rule 19.33  Judge 
Rakoff relied on an earlier decision in the Southern District of Texas, 
																																																																																																																																
 25. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), vacated 
sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, No. 11-1150-CV1150-CV(L), 2011 WL 4375022 
(2d Cir. Sept. 19, 2011), rev’d and remanded sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 
667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 423 (2012). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 29. Id. at 598–99. 
 30. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527 (VLB), 1994 WL 142006, at *9 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994). 
 31. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 599. 
 32. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated sub 
nom., Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 33. Id. 
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which had dismissed an action brought by a group of Ecuadorian 
plaintiffs against Texaco for forum non conveniens and international 
comity.34  In the Texas decision, the court applied the traditional 
forum non conveniens analysis articulated in Piper Aircraft Co. v. 
Reyno35: first finding an available forum, and then weighing private 
and public factors.  The Texas court found that the majority of the 
factors—that the witnesses were in Ecuador, the alleged tort took 
place in Ecuador, the plaintiffs are Ecuadorian, and an Ecuadorian 
court was unlikely to enforce a judgment from a U.S. court—weighed 
in favor of finding Ecuador as the proper forum.36 
Regarding the independent grounds for dismissing the action for 
failure to join an indispensable party under Rule 19, the Southern 
District of New York noted that the “extensive equitable relief sought 
by the plaintiffs—ranging from total environmental ‘clean-up’ of the 
affected lands in Ecuador to a major alteration of the consortium’s 
Trans–Ecuador pipeline to the direct monitoring of the affected lands 
for years to come—cannot possibly be undertaken in the absence of 
Petroecuador . . . .”37  Nonetheless, although Petroecuador and the 
ROE were subject to service of process, neither could be joined, 
because neither could be sued in the United States under the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act.38  When a necessary party is immune to 
suit in the United States, that alone is usually enough to warrant 
dismissal.39  Thus, Texaco’s motion was granted.40 
The plaintiffs appealed Judge Rakoff’s decision to the Second 
Circuit.41  The Second Circuit remanded the case for reconsideration, 
primarily because it wanted Texaco to agree to submit to the 
jurisdiction of the Ecuadorian court system.42  Texaco eventually 
consented to submit to the jurisdiction of Ecuador,43 and the Second 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s second dismissal for forum non 
conveniens in 2002.44 
																																																																																																																																
 34. Id. (citing Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994)). 
 35. Sequihua, 847 F. Supp. at 64 (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 
(1981)). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Aguinda, 945 F. Supp. at 627. 
 38. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(b), 1604 (2012)). 
 39. Id. (citing Fluent v. Salamanca Indian Lease Auth., 928 F.2d 542, 547–48 (2d 
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 818 (1991)). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 42. Id. at 159. 
 43. See Chevron Corp. v. Salazar, 807 F. Supp. 2d 189, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 44. Aguinda v. Texaco, 303 F.3d 470, 480 (2d Cir. 2002). 
274 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLI 
Chevron Corp. (Chevron) appeared on the scene in 2001 when it 
acquired Texaco—after Texaco left the consortium and settled 
environmental claims with the ROE.45  Soon after the dismissal for 
forum non conveniens, the same American lawyers who brought the 
first two putative class action suits brought another action in Ecuador 
against Chevron for Texaco’s actions in Ecuador before 1992.46  The 
plaintiffs in the litigation—the Lagro Agrio Plaintiffs (LAPs)—
included many of the Aguinda plaintiffs.47  The Ecuadorian provincial 
court eventually entered a judgment against Chevron in the amount 
of $8.646 billion.48 
The Ecuadorian court’s judgment stated that it would double that 
amount in punitive damages unless Chevron issued a “public 
apology” to the LAPs within fifteen days.49  Chevron did not 
apologize, and the judgment is now valued at over $18 billion.50 
Unfortunately for the LAPs, Chevron had no assets in Ecuador.51  
This hiccup, however, did not discourage them in the least.  After the 
judgment was issued in Ecuador, the LAPs’ attorneys stated that they 
intended to collect on the judgment as soon as possible in multiple 
jurisdictions around the world, even before the appeal was heard in 
the Ecuadorian court system, as was their “right.”52  Soon afterwards 
(and here lies the heart of our story), Chevron filed an action in the 
Southern District of New York seeking a preliminary injunction to 
halt enforcement of the Ecuadorian judgment until a trial on the 
merits of the case could be held.53  Substantively, Chevron’s complaint 
asserted nine claims seeking damages and an injunction against 
enforcement of the Lago Agrio judgment.54  The claims were asserted 
against fifty-six defendants falling into four groups: Stephen Donziger 
(the lead attorney for the LAPs) and his firm; Stratus Consulting, Inc. 
(Stratus) (the company the LAPs hired to comment on the expert 
report) and two of its employees; four Ecuadorian individuals and 
																																																																																																																																
 45. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), vacated 
sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, No. 11-1150-CV(L), 2011 WL 4375022 (2d Cir. 
Sept. 19, 2011) rev’d and remanded sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 
232 (2d Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 423, 184 (2012). 
 46. Id. at 594. 
 47. Id. at 600. 
 48. Id. at 621. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 660. 
 52. Id. at 594 n.4. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 625. 
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entities that have participated in the Lago Agrian litigation in various 
overlapping ways; and the LAPs themselves.55 
The first two claims asserted substantive and conspiracy claims 
under RICO against all defendants except the LAPs.56  In the third to 
seventh counts, Chevron asserted against all defendants state tort 
claims, including fraud, tortious interference with contract, trespass to 
chattels, unjust enrichment on the ground that any recovery on the 
Lago Agrio judgment would be inequitable, and a state claim for civil 
conspiracy alleging that the defendants conspired to commit the 
substantive violations described above.57  Against Donziger and his 
law firm specifically, Chevron asserted violations of the New York 
Judiciary Law governing the conduct of lawyers.58  Finally, Chevron 
also sought a declaration, pursuant to the DJA, that the Lago Agrio 
judgment is not entitled to recognition or enforcement in the United 
States or anywhere else. 59  Thus, the preliminary injunction to stop 
enforcement of the foreign judgment anywhere in the world was 
merely a prelude to the underlying RICO, common law tort, and 
other claims (although the RICO claims seem to have been the main 
concern of those underlying claims, as evidenced by a later suit 
Chevron brought in the Southern District of New York60). 
In favor of the preliminary injunction Chevron argued, among 
other things, that the judgment was unenforceable in the United 
States because the proceedings in Ecuador did not comport with due 
process, and the judgment was obtained by fraud.61  The district court, 
after concluding that the matter was a sufficient controversy for 
issuing declaratory relief,62 in a drastic move issued a worldwide 
injunction to prevent the LAPs from enforcing the Ecuadorian 
judgment.63  The district court justified its ability to issue a worldwide 
declaratory action by concluding: 
A declaratory judgment by this Court as to the enforceability of the 
Ecuadorian judgment would finally determine the controversy over 
																																																																																																																																
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 625–26. 
 58. Id.; see N.Y. JUD. § 487 (McKinney 2005). 
 59. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 626. 
 60. See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 871 F. Supp. 2d 229 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 61. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 594. 
 62. Id. at 637–38.  The court concluded that the matter was a sufficient 
controversy because the Ecuadorian court had issued a multibillion-dollar judgment, 
and the LAP plaintiffs had specifically stated their intention to enforce the judgment 
worldwide.  Id. 
 63. Id. at 660. 
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enforceability, at least for the United States and quite possibly more 
broadly. Indeed, since equity acts in personam, the Court may issue 
an injunction barring all of the defendants from filing enforcement 
proceedings in other jurisdictions. Hence, this Court’s judgment 
should finally determine the controversy worldwide.64 
In deciding whether to issue the injunction, the district court 
applied the factors articulated in China Trade,65 as well as those 
articulated by the Second Circuit in Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods, 
Ltd.66 to determine whether declaratory judgment was proper under 
the DJA.67 
After the Donziger decision, Chevron announced its intention to 
appeal the Ecuadorian court’s judgment,68 which it did in March 
2011.69  Unfortunately for Chevron, the Ecuadorian appellate judges 
affirmed the judgment.70 
Then, the Second Circuit reversed the Donzinger court’s decision 
on appeal.71  In its opinion, the Second Circuit concluded that the 
factors in China Trade were of “limited relevance” 72 because the 
action was for an anti-enforcement injunction, rather than an anti-suit 
injunction, and New York’s version of the Recognition Act does not 
allow for a preemptive anti-enforcement injunction.73  Because the 
LAPs had not yet sought to enforce the Ecuadorian judgment in the 
United States, the court concluded that Chevron had no claim under 
the Recognition Act.74  Moreover, the Second Circuit found that 
																																																																																																																																
 64. Id. at 638. 
 65. 837 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1987).  The district court stated that “[i]n this circuit, 
China Trade . . . and its progeny provide the standard for determining when a court 
may enjoin parties before it from commencing or pursuing litigation in foreign 
jurisdictions.” Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 646. 
 66. 346 F.3d 357, 359–60 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 67. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 637–38, 646–48. 
 68. Press Release, Chevron, Illegitimate Judgment Against Chevron in Ecuador 
Lawsuit (Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.chevron.com/chevron/pressreleases/article/ 
02142011_illegitimatejudgmentagainstchevroninecuadorlawsuit.news. 
 69. Press Release, Chevron, Chevron Appeals Ecuador Judgment (Mar. 11, 2011), 
http://www.chevron.com/chevron/pressreleases/article/03112011_chevronappealsecua
dorjudgment.news. 
 70. Press Release, Chevron, Chevron Condemns Illegitimate Decision by 
Ecuador Appellate Court (Jan. 3, 2012), http://www.chevron.com/chevron/ 
pressreleases/article/01032012_chevroncondemnsillegitimatedecisionbyecuadorappell
atecourt.news. 
 71. Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 
423 (2012). 
 72. Id. at 243. 
 73. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5304 (McKinney 2012). 
 74. Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 242. 
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although Chevron sought the injunction under the far-reaching DJA, 
the rights conferred by that Act were “procedural only” and “do[] not 
create an independent cause of action.”75  In almost every other suit 
for declaratory judgment, the suit is brought by the judgment-
creditor, and the judgment-debtor defends against enforcement 
pursuant to the Recognition Act.76  No part of the Act allows for 
preemptive suits for declaratory action by the judgment-debtor 
before the judgment-creditor has tried to enforce the judgment in that 
jurisdiction.77  Finally, the Second Circuit looked to international 
comity considerations and concluded that interpreting the 
Recognition Act to allow courts to grant worldwide injunctions would 
disrespect other sovereign judicial systems.78 
Since the Second Circuit’s reversal of Judge Kaplan’s global anti-
enforcement injunction, the LAPs have brought actions to enforce 
the Ecuadorian judgment in Canada, Argentina, and Brazil.79  Adding 
another twist to the story, Chevron has recently filed the declaration 
of a former Ecuadorian judge in the Southern District of New York,80 
in which the judge, Alberto Guerra, described how he and another 
former judge “allowed the LAPs’ lawyers to ghostwrite their entire 
188-page, $18.2 billion judgment against Chevron in exchange for a 
promise of $500,000 from the anticipated recovery.”81  Thus, if the 
affidavit is true, it is important to mention that notwithstanding the 
rulings discussed in this Note, the Ecuadorian judgment would not be 
																																																																																																																																
 75. Id. at 244–45 (citations omitted). 
 76. Id. at 240. 
 77. Id.  The court also said the structure of the Recognition Act was “clear” and 
did not allow for preemptive suits by the judgment-debtor. Id. 
 78. Id. at 242. 
 79. Eduardo Garcia, Ecuador Plaintiffs Target Chevron’s Assets in Brazil, 
REUTERS, June 27, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/28/us-ecuador-
chevron-idUSBRE85R01I20120628; Pablo Gonzalez, Ecuador to Sue Chevron in 
Argentina to Enforce Judgment, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 31, 2012), 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-10-31/ecuador-to-sue-chevron-in-argentina-
to-enforce-judgment; Stephen G.A. Pitel, Enforcement of the Ecuadorian Judgment 
Against Chevron in Ontario: The Ontario Law, OPINIO JURIS (June 1, 2012, 10:30 
AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/06/01/enforcement-of-ecuadorian-judgment-against-
chevron-in-ontario-the-ontario-law. 
 80. See Alberto Guerra Bastidas, Sworn Declaration, (Nov. 12, 2012) 
http://www.theamazonpost.com/wp-content/uploads/Declaration-of-A-
Guerra_English-REDACTED.pdf. 
 81. Roger Parloff, Ex-Judge Says He Was Bribed by Ecuadorians’ Suing Chevron, 
CNNMONEY (Jan. 28, 2013, 10:47 AM), http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2013/ 
01/28/judge-chevron-ecuador. 
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recognizable under U.S. law if the LAPs attempt to enforce it in the 
United States.82 
II.  RELEVANT LAW 
This Part provides the background necessary to understand the 
issues posed by the Donziger and Naranjo decisions within the 
Chevron-Ecuador litigation, which are discussed in further detail in 
Part III.  Part II.A discusses the relevant law on recognition of 
judgments.  Part II.B outlines the relevant domestic law on granting 
anti-suit injunctions, and their possible application to anti-
“enforcement” injunctions (as the Second Circuit calls them, and as 
this Note refers to them).  Part II.C reviews the DJA, and, finally, 
Part II.D summarizes the applicable law on ripeness requirements in 
the federal court system and their possible relevance to preemptive 
requests for anti-enforcement injunctions.  Each legal regime is 
integral to understanding the issues posed by Donziger and Naranjo, 
because the courts in both cases examine multiple legal arguments in 
deciding whether to permit the worldwide preliminary injunction 
against the LAPs.  Both the Southern District of New York and the 
Second Circuit, for example, discuss the relevance of the anti-suit 
injunction test, the DJA, and the Recognition Act.83  Neither 
discusses whether the action is ripe, but the related Yahoo! case84 also 
involved a claim for a declaration of non-enforceability of a foreign 
judgment before a proceeding to enforce that judgment was brought 
in the United States, and some of judges in the splintered en banc 
Yahoo! opinion did conduct a ripeness analysis.85 
																																																																																																																																
 82. See RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 8, § 4(a)(1) (identifying one of the grounds 
for non-recognition, namely, when “the judgment was rendered under a system which 
does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements 
of due process of law”).  As noted below, some version of the Recognition Act has 
been codified by most states. See infra notes 101–02 and accompanying text. 
 83. See Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 240–45; Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 
581, 632–38, 646–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), vacated sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 
No. 11-1150-CV(L), 2011 WL 4375022 (2d Cir. Sept. 19, 2011), rev’d and remanded 
sub nom. Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. 
Ct. 423, 184 (2012). 
 84. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Lingue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme (Yahoo! 
III), 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
 85. See id. at 1201. 
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A. Recognition of Foreign (Money) Judgments in the United 
States 
There is currently no federal statute governing recognition of 
foreign judgments in the United States.86  The United States is also 
not a party to any international treaty or convention on recognition 
and enforcement of foreign-country judgments.87  Despite these facts, 
the United States appears to be the most receptive of any major 
country to recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.88 
Traditionally, state decisional law governs recognition of foreign 
country judgments.89  Thus, there is some variation among the several 
states regarding whether a foreign judgment will be enforced against 
the judgment-debtor’s assets.  Regardless of whether a state has 
codified the Recognition Act or relies on common law, “no state 
recognizes or enforces the judgment of another state rendered 
without jurisdiction over the judgment-debtor.”90 
In Hilton v. Guyot, a landmark decision in U.S. judgment 
recognition law, the United States Supreme Court based its judgment 
on the principle of international comity, setting the precedent U.S. 
courts must follow when determining the extent of recognition and 
enforceability of foreign court judgments.91  The Court held that 
																																																																																																																																
 86. Edward H. Davis, Jr. & Annette C. Escobar, A Practitioner’s Guide to 
Enforcement of Foreign Country Money Judgments in the United States, in 
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION STRATEGIES AND PRACTICE 131 (Barton Legum ed., 
2005). 
 87. See Stephen B. Burbank, A Tea Party at the Hague?, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 629, 
629–30 (2012); see also ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND 
ARBITRATION 472 (3d ed. 2006).  Negotiations on this subject at the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law have broken down, albeit due to disputes 
over jurisdiction of courts rather than enforcement of judgments. Id. 
 88. See LOWENFELD, supra note 87 at 473; see also Richard J. Graving, The 
Carefully Crafted 2005 Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition 
Act Cures a Serious Constitutional Defect in Its 1962 Predecessor, 16 MICH. ST. J. 
INT’L L. 289, 290 (2007) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW ch. 8, intro. (1987)).  U.S. receptiveness to foreign-country judgments is not 
often returned, presumably due to the high damage awards in U.S. negligence cases 
(particularly in products liability suits). DAVID EPSTEIN & CHARLES S. BALDWIN, IV, 
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: A GUIDE TO JURISDICTION, PRACTICE, AND STRATEGY 
376 (4th rev. ed. 2010).  The liberality and size of American damage awards is an 
impediment to the United States’ ability to enter into multi- or bilateral treaties with 
other countries, putting the United States at a disadvantage with countries who are 
parties to such agreements. Id. 
 89. See, e.g., Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 152 N.E. 121 
(N.Y. 1926). 
 90. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW ch. 8, intro. note (1987). 
 91. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163; see EPSTEIN & BALDWIN, IV, supra note 88, at 377. 
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recognition of foreign-country judgments was a matter of the “comity 
of nations,”92 and described the principle of comity as follows: 
 ‘Comity,’ in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute 
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, 
upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows 
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of 
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and 
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons 
who are under the protection of its laws.93 
The Court in Hilton also outlined specific situations where comity 
should be followed, including scenarios in which the foreign 
proceeding was conducted before a court of “competent jurisdiction” 
and no fraud could be shown.94  The Court’s articulation of the 
principle of international comity has remained the most authoritative 
passage from Hilton, despite the suggestion that it was merely dicta.95 
In 1962, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws (the Commissioners) created a recommended uniform 
state statute for recognition of foreign country money judgments in 
the United States.96  The 1962 Recognition Act claimed to present 
“rules that have long been applied by the majority of courts in this 
country.”97  Some thirty states, the District of Columbia, and the 
Virgin Islands have adopted the Recognition Act in some form.98 
																																																																																																																																
 92. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163. 
 93. Id. at 163–64. 
 94. The Hilton Court described specific situations where comity should be 
followed: 
[W]e are satisfied that where there has been opportunity for a full and fair 
trial abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial 
upon regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance of the 
defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial 
administration of justice between the citizens of its own country and those 
of other countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court, 
or in the system of laws under which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the 
judgment, or any other special reason why the comity of this nation should 
not allow it full effect, the merits of the case should not, in an action brought 
in this country upon the judgment, be tried afresh, as on a new trial or an 
appeal, upon the mere assertion of the party that the judgment was 
erroneous in law or in fact. The defendants, therefore, cannot be permitted, 
upon that general ground, to contest the validity or the effect of the 
judgment sued on. 
Id. at 202–03. 
 95. LOWENFELD, supra note 87, at 491 n.2. 
 96. RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 8. 
 97. RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 8, Prefatory Note. 
 98. Graving, supra note 88 at 293. 
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The Act defines a “foreign state” as “any governmental unit other 
than the United States, or any state, district, commonwealth, 
territory, insular possession thereof, or the Panama Canal Zone, the 
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or the Ryukyu Islands,”99 and 
“foreign judgment” as “any judgment of a foreign state granting or 
denying recovery of a sum of money, other than a judgment for taxes, 
a fine or other penalty, or a judgment for support in matrimonial or 
family matters.”100  The Act also states that it applies to “any foreign 
judgment that is final and conclusive and enforceable where rendered 
even though an appeal therefrom is pending or it is subject to 
appeal.”101  Generally speaking, unless one of the grounds for non-
recognition come in to play, the Act considers a judgment conclusive 
when it grants or denies a sum of money, which makes it enforceable 
in the same way other U.S. states must recognize each others’ 
judgments under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.102  The various grounds for non-recognition under the 
Recognition Act include multiple situations, such as where “the 
judgment was rendered under a system which does not provide 
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of 
due process of law,” there was no personal jurisdiction, or the foreign 
judgment was obtained by fraud.103 
In 2005, the Commissioners adopted a revision of the 1962 Act, 
making a few “perfecting” changes.104  The 2005 Uniform Foreign-
Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, like its predecessor, 
seeks to promote uniformity and gain wider acceptance of U.S. 
judgments abroad.105  Only three states have adopted the 2005 Act.106  
The remaining twenty or so states that have not adopted either the 
1962 or the 2005 Act rely on common-law notions of “comity,” 107 
along with sections of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations 
Law.108  Most states, however, have maintained their codification of 
the 1962 Recognition Act.109   New York, one of the busiest states for 
																																																																																																																																
 99. RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 8, § 1(1). 
 100. Id. § 1(2). 
 101. Id. § 2. 
 102. Id. § 3; see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 103. RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 8, § 4 (a)(1)–(2), (b)(2). 
 104. Graving, supra note 88, at 289.  Some argue that the 2005 revisions cure a 
constitutional defect in its 1962 predecessor. Id. at 289–90. 
 105. Id. at 290–91; see 2005 RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 17. 
 106. See Graving, supra note 88, at 293. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 481, 482 (1987). 
 109. Graving, supra note 88, at 293. 
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international litigation, has adopted the 1962 Act, with significant 
changes.110   Most importantly for the purposes of the Chevron-
Ecuador litigation, fraud is one of the discretionary grounds for non-
recognition under New York’s version of the Recognition Act.111  
Further, the 1964 Act provides that it is a mandatory ground for non-
recognition if “the judgment was rendered under a system which does 
not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the 
requirements of due process of law.”112  Chevron argued in Donziger 
that the Ecuadorian judgment would not be enforceable in the United 
States because the proceedings in Ecuador did not comport with due 
process, and that the judgment was obtained by fraud because the 
LAPs’ attorneys (among several other things) “ghostwrote” the 
appointed expert’s report and intimidated the Ecuadorian judges.113 
B. Anti-Suit Injunctions 
Even before a judgment is reached, one of the most valuable (and 
possibly irritating) tools available to parties involved in international 
disputes is the anti-suit injunction.  Anti-suit injunctions show up 
most frequently in parallel proceedings, either internationally or 
domestically—where a single dispute is litigated simultaneously in 
front of two or more different courts.114  Parties often have several 
choices regarding the country in which to litigate a transnational 
dispute, and therefore parallel litigation is not uncommon.115  Most 
anti-suit injunction cases deal with parallel actions in the United 
States and another country.116 
U.S. federal Circuit courts unanimously agree that federal district 
courts have the power to issue anti-suit injunctions against parties 
subject to their jurisdiction.117  The Circuits also agree that anti-suit 
																																																																																																																																
 110. Id. at 293; see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5303 (McKinney 1997). 
 111. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5304(b)(3) (McKinney 1997). 
 112. Id. § 5304(a)(1). 
 113. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 592, 607, 611–12 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011), vacated sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, No. 11-1150-CV(L), 2011 WL 
4375022 (2d Cir. Sept. 19, 2011), rev’d and remanded sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. 
Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 423 (2012). 
 114. José I. Astigarraga & Scott A. Burr, Antisuit Injunctions, Anti-Antisuit 
Injunctions, and Other Worldly Wonders, in INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: 
STRATEGIES AND PRACTICE 89 (Barton Legum, ed. 2005). 
 115. Heiser, supra note 2, at 855. 
 116. Id. at 856. 
 117. David J. Levy, Antisuit Injunctions in Multinational Cases, in 
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: DEFENDING AND SUING FOREIGN PARTIES IN U.S. 
FEDERAL COURTS 163–64 (David J. Levy ed., 2003) (citing Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles 
Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 626 (5th Cir. 1996)). 
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injunctions should be used “sparingly.”118  The Circuits are split, 
however, on what standard should be used in deciding whether to 
grant an anti-suit injunction rather than stay their own proceedings or 
let both actions proceed to judgment.  Scholars have called the two 
sides of the split “liberal” and “restrictive,”119 or sometimes “liberal” 
and “conservative.”120 
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits (and possibly the Seventh Circuit as 
well) remain on the “liberal” side of the split.121  These Circuits have 
held that district courts may issue anti-suit injunctions when litigation 
in a foreign forum would become vexatious and delay efficient 
proceedings, rather than focusing on international comity.122  
Regarding the “liberal” side of the Circuit split, the main criticism is 
that this approach somehow conveys the message that the court 
issuing the anti-suit injunction is suggesting that it has “so little 
confidence in the foreign court’s ability to adjudicate a given dispute 
fairly and efficiently that it is unwilling to even allow the 
possibility.”123  It has also been suggested that if anti-suit injunctions 
are easily available, both courts will be able to issue these injunctions 
and essentially paralyze the litigation.124 
On the “conservative” or “restrictive” side of the split are the First, 
Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and District of Columbia Circuits.125  
																																																																																																																																
 118. See, e.g., Seattle Totems Hockey Club v. Nat’l Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852, 
855 (9th Cir. 1981); Philip v. Macri, 261 F.2d 945, 947 (9th Cir. 1958). 
 119. See Levy, supra note 117, at 164. 
 120. Heiser, supra note 2, at 857–58. 
 121. See Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 1996); Allendale Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys. Inc., 10 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 1993); Seattle Totems Hockey 
Club, 652 F.2d 852. 
 122. See Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 627 (holding that a district court does not abuse its 
discretion in issuing an anti-suit injunction “when it has determined that allowing 
simultaneous prosecution of the same action in a foreign forum . . . would result in 
inequitable hardship and tend to frustrate and delay the speedy and efficiency 
determination of the case”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Seattle Totems 
Hockey Club, 652 F.2d 852 (affirming a district court’s anti-suit injunction when it 
considered “the convenience to the parties and witnesses, the interest of the courts in 
promoting the efficient administration of justice, and the potential prejudice to one 
party or the other, and concluded that the equitable balance weighs heavily in favor 
of plaintiffs” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 123. Goss Int’l Corp. v. Man Roland Druckmaschinen Aktiengesellschaft, 491 F.3d 
355, 360 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 124. Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1354–55 (6th Cir. 1992). 
 125. See Goss Int’l Corp. v. Man Roland Druckmaschinen Aktiengesellschaft, 491 
F.3d 355 (8th Cir. 2007); Quaak v. KPMG Bedrijfsrevisoren, 361 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 
2004); Stonington Partners v. Lernout & Hauspie Speech Prods. N.V., 310 F.3d 118 
(3d Cir. 2002); Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir. 1992); 
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The general rule in these jurisdictions is to allow parallel proceedings 
“on the same in personam claim” to “proceed simultaneously, at least 
until judgment is reached in one which can be pled as res judicata in 
the other.”126  The idea is that international comity would favor not 
issuing an anti-suit injunction out of respect for the sovereignty of 
other court systems.127  These Circuits elevate the principle of 
international comity to a higher level than the “liberal” circuits do, 
holding that a foreign anti-suit injunction will be granted only to 
protect the jurisdiction of a U.S. court or important public policies of 
the forum.128  Critics of the “conservative” approach argue that where 
public international issues are not involved, efficiency should be 
promoted over international comity—after all, parallel proceedings 
are long, drawn out, and expensive.129  Moreover, allowing parallel 
proceedings to go forward inevitably leads to a “race to judgment,” 
which is completely dependent upon the efficiency and methods of 
procedure within the parallel jurisdictions.130 
A modified restrictive approach might mitigate this concern.  The 
Second Circuit, for example, adopted a more flexible version of the 
conservative approach by factoring in whether adjudications of the 
same issues in separate actions would lead to a race to judgment.131  
Specifically, the test articulated in China Trade begins by inquiring 
“(1) whether the parties to both suits are the same and (2) whether 
resolution of the case before the enjoining court would be dispositive 
of the enjoined action.”132  Next, the court looks at a variety of other 
factors, such as the “vexatiousness” of the parallel proceeding, 
whether the two actions will lead to a race to judgment causing 
additional expense, “whether the foreign action threatens the 
                                                                                                                             
China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1987); Laker 
Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 126. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 926–27. 
 127. See Heiser, supra note 2, at 859 (2011). 
 128. See, e.g., China Trade, 837 F.2d at 36–37 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that avoiding 
vexatiousness or a race to judgment is not enough to satisfy international comity 
requirements, adding the jurisdictional and public policy factors); see also Laker 
Airways, 731 F.3d at 934 (enjoining the defendants in that litigation from litigating in 
a British court to protect its own jurisdiction). 
 129. Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 130. See Kathryn E. Vertigan, Note, Foreign Antisuit Injunctions: Taking A 
Lesson from the Act of State Doctrine, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 155, 173 (2007). 
 131. See China Trade, 837 F.2d at 35–36; see also Vertigan, supra note 130, at 172–
73.  Interestingly, the Second Circuit also does not take into account the citizenship of 
the parties at hand. See Margarita Treviño de Coale, Stay, Dismiss, Enjoin or 
Abstain?: A Survey of Foreign Parallel Litigation in the Federal Courts of the United 
States, 17 B.U. INT’L L.J. 79, 107 (1999). 
 132. China Trade, 837 F.2d at 36. 
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jurisdiction of the enjoining forum, and . . . whether strong public 
policies of the enjoining forum are threatened by the foreign 
action.”133 
The anti-suit injunction Circuit split is relevant because the   
Donziger court applied the China Trade factors (the relevant 
standard in the Second Circuit) in deciding whether to grant an 
injunction enjoining the LAPs from suing for enforcement.134  There is 
no literature on whether anti-suit injunction analysis should apply to 
claims for anti-enforcement injunctions (particularly before the 
judgment-creditor has tried to enforce the judgment).  After all, 
parallel proceedings usually apply when there are multiple identical 
actions going on at the same time in multiple fora.  Nor is there 
literature on whether a court can issue an anti-enforcement action (as 
the Second Circuit calls it) under the same standards. 
C. The Declaratory Judgment Act 
Chevron also argued that the requested injunction was merely a 
claim for a declaratory judgment.135  The DJA allows a district court 
to declare the legal rights or legal relations of an interested party 
seeking the declaration in a case of actual controversy within that 
court’s jurisdiction.136  Any such declaration will have “the force and 
effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as 
such.”137  Like the Recognition Act, the rights afforded by the DJA 
are procedural only,138 and do not create an independent cause of 
action.139  Courts have held consistently that the DJA contains a 
broad grant of discretion to district courts “to refuse to exercise 
jurisdiction over a declaratory action that they would be otherwise 
empowered to hear.”140 
When there is a valid basis for a declaratory judgment, however, 
the relevant test to apply in the Second Circuit is the balancing test 
																																																																																																																																
 133. Id. (quoting Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 927, 937). 
 134. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 646–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), 
vacated sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, No. 11-1150-CV(L), 2011 WL 4375022 
(2d Cir. Sept. 19, 2011), rev’d and remanded sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 
667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 423 (2012). 
 135. Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 244 (2d Cir. 2012).  It seems that 
Chevron was arguing for everything and anything that could support the injunction. 
 136. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950). 
 139. Davis v. United States, 499 F.3d 590, 594 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 140. Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods, Ltd., 346 F.3d 357, 359 (2d Cir. 2003). 
286 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLI 
set forth in Dow Jones.141  In Dow Jones, the court looked to a set of 
factors to guide its decision of whether to exercise the discretion 
granted by the DJA.142  Those factors built on an older test the 
Second Circuit adopted, considering “(1) whether the judgment will 
serve a useful purpose in clarifying or settling the legal issues 
involved; and (2) whether a judgment would finalize the controversy 
and offer relief from uncertainty.”143  The court noted that other 
Circuits have built more factors into the test, which include: 
1) whether the proposed remedy is being used merely for 
‘procedural fencing’ or a ‘race to res judicata’; 2) whether the use of 
a declaratory judgment would increase friction between sovereign 
legal systems or improperly encroach on the domain of a state or 
foreign court; and 3) whether there is a better or more effective 
remedy.144 
The court in Dow Jones applied all five of these factors, and since 
then, the Second Circuit has seen fit to apply all five together as a 
unified test to determine whether to grant a declaratory judgment.145  
A district court’s application of these factors is typically reviewed for 
abuse of discretion.146 
D. Ripeness 
Although the Donziger and Naranjo courts did not address the 
injunction in terms of ripeness, preemptive declaratory non-
enforcement actions in other areas (such as in libel tourism cases) 
have been discussed in terms of ripeness before.147  In the federal 
court system, ripeness is drawn from both Article III of the United 
States Constitution and “prudential reasons for refusing to exercise 
jurisdiction.”148  A given action must satisfy two prudential 
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 148. See U.S. CONST. art. III; Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. DOI, 538 U.S. 803, 
808 (2003) (quoting Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993)). 
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requirements for ripeness: “the fitness of the issues for judicial 
decision” and “the hardship to the parties of withholding court 
consideration.”149  Courts must generally consider the facts at hand to 
see if they present the problems of “prematurity and abstractness” 
that counsel against reaching the merits of a given case.150 
III.  PROBLEMS POSED BY THE CHEVRON-ECUADOR LITIGATION 
This Part lays out the issues posed by the Donziger and Naranjo 
decisions in the Chevron-Ecuador litigation.  It outlines four possible 
ways to deal with this Note’s overarching, initial question: whether a 
U.S. court can (or should be able to) provide any remedy precluding 
enforcement of an unfair foreign money judgment, particularly before 
the plaintiffs have tried to enforce the judgment in the United States.  
Before that question can be answered, however, the preliminary 
question of what underlying legal analysis applies to this injunction 
(which was implicitly discussed in Donziger and Naranjo when the 
courts applied multiple legal analyses) must be addressed, if only to 
figure out what exactly happened.  If the district court was right, and 
an anti-enforcement injunction is in reality no different from an anti-
suit injunction, then that poses a different set of problems than the 
Second Circuit’s assertion that the Recognition Act alone applies, but 
cannot apply (even in conjunction with the DJA) unless the LAPs try 
to enforce the judgment in the United States. 
If the anti-enforcement action fails because of lack of ripeness, 
then theoretically the issue could not have been decided at that 
time—at least not until the LAPs try to enforce the judgment in the 
United States.  In other words, if the case is unripe until the plaintiffs 
try to enforce the judgment, then once the plaintiffs try to enforce the 
judgment in the United States, the Second Circuit is correct that the 
judgment-debtor may make use of the various grounds for non-
recognition listed in New York’s codification of the Recognition 
Act.151 
																																																																																																																																
 149. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967), abrogated by Califano v. 
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). 
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The following Parts evaluate the relevant court decisions in the 
Chevron-Ecuador litigation, as well as some other possible answers to 
this Note’s preliminary question and the implications that those 
answers would have on the overarching question.  Part III.A discusses 
the problems posed by the Donziger decision.  Part III.B analyzes the 
Naranjo decision.  Part III.C discusses a decision issued by the Ninth 
Circuit, Shell Oil Co., which is relevant to the Naranjo decision 
because it was cited by the Second Circuit as possibly interpreting the 
DJA and the Recognition Act to allow the declaration of non-
enforceability of a foreign money judgment in the United States 
before the foreign plaintiffs had (technically) sought enforcement.  
Part III.D addresses the background to the Yahoo! decision, and its 
possible relevance to the issue at hand. 
A. The Donziger Decision 
When the Donziger court granted the worldwide injunction against 
the LAPs, it was part of a long and carefully thought-out opinion, 
detailing the history of the litigation and the various claims Chevron 
made against the LAPs.152  In arriving at the decision to grant the 
worldwide injunction (establishing the history of the litigation, the 
role of the attorney Donziger, the allegations of corruption, and the 
UNCITRAL arbitration), Judge Kaplan first discussed the standards 
for issuing a preliminary injunction.153  In the Second Circuit, “[a] 
party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish irreparable 
harm and either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits or (b) 
sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and a balance of 
hardships tipping decidedly in its favor.”154  Judge Kaplan determined 
the evidence established that “the LAPs and their allies intend 
quickly to pursue multiple enforcement actions and asset seizures, 
including ex parte remedies where possible, around the globe,” and 
without a preliminary injunction, “Chevron would be forced to 
defend itself and litigate the enforceability of the Ecuadorian 
judgment in multiple proceedings.”155  The court also mentioned that 
                                                                                                                             
not create an affirmative cause of action to declare foreign judgments void and enjoin 
their enforcement.”). 
 152. See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), 
vacated sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, No. 11-1150-CV(L), 2011 WL 4375022 
(2d Cir. Sept. 19, 2011), rev’d and remanded sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 
667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 423 (2012). 
 153. Id. at 626. 
 154. Kamerling v. Massanari, 295 F.3d 206, 214 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 155. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 626–27. 
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there was a great risk that Chevron’s assets would be seized or 
attached, disrupting Chevron’s supply chain and damaging the 
goodwill it has with its customers, and concluded that Chevron was 
threatened with immediate and irreparable injury.156  Judge Kaplan 
concluded that the aforementioned threatened harm would be 
irreparable, and even if the LAPs collected before the validity of the 
judgment was determined, Chevron would not be able to get the 
money back.157  The opinion noted that there would be no remedy for 
the coercive effect of litigating in multiple places—the damage would 
have already been done.158  Plus, the damages would have been 
“difficult to establish and measure,” meaning that, for both reasons, 
equitable relief was appropriate.159 
The Donzinger court also found that Chevron had established 
imminence in light of the relevant law.  The LAPs, the court said, may 
even now seek “preventive measures” in freezing Chevron’s assets in 
other countries.160  As soon as the appeal had been decided (unless 
the judgment was overturned), the LAPs could start running all over 
the world to try to enforce the judgment.  Moreover, Judge Kaplan 
wrote that “[g]iven the history and circumstances of this case, there is 
substantial reason to believe that the process will move quickly.”161  
Then, the “game would change dramatically.”162  Indeed, the 
pendency of a further appeal in Ecuador would not stop recognition 
and enforcement proceedings here, unless the judgment was found 
unenforceable in Ecuador.163 
Next, the district court determined that the availability of appellate 
remedies and a possible stay in the Ecuador proceedings did not 
preclude finding the threat of irreparable injury because the showing 
of likely success on the merits (in proving that Ecuador did not 
provide impartial tribunals) would “foreclose[] the propriety of 
assuming that the judgment debtor will receive due process in the 
appellate process in the rendering nation.”164  The district court 
																																																																																																																																
 156. Id. at 627. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
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discussed the balance of hardships, and determined that the balance 
tipped in favor of Chevron.165 
Turning to the likelihood of success on the merits, the district court 
determined that the Ecuadorian judgment was not entitled to 
recognition or enforcement and that Chevron showed the requisite 
likelihood of success on its claim that Ecuador did not provide 
impartial tribunals and due process.166  The court looked to New 
York’s codification of the Recognition Act in Article 53 of the Civil 
Practice Law and Rules.167 
Regarding recognition and enforcement, Judge Kaplan summed up 
the body of law in that area starting with Hilton.168  He noted that 
“[i]n determining whether a foreign legal system ‘provide[s] impartial 
tribunals [and] procedures compatible with due process of law,’ a 
court considers not only the structure and design of the judicial 
system at issue, but also ‘its practice during the period in question.’”169  
The court concluded that the Ecuadorian court had not provided for 
impartial tribunals.  In coming to that decision, the court looked to a 
report from Vladimiro Alvarez Grau (the Alvarez Report), prepared 
in September 2010.  The court described Alvarez as “an impressively 
credentialed expert who has practiced law in Ecuador for nearly forty 
years and has held numerous elected and appointed public offices and 
legal academic positions in that country.”170  The Alvarez Report 
concluded that the Ecuadorian court system habitually failed to act 
impartially—that the President has control and threatens and 
pressures the judges.171  The court also made much of the fact that 
Donziger himself, in opposing Texaco’s motion for forum non 
conveniens in the original action in the Southern District of New 
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York, had described the Ecuadorian court system as corrupt, 
declaring that it was the judges’ “birthright . . . to be corrupt!”172  And 
yet, here he was, extolling the virtues of the Ecuadorian justice system 
in an attempt to enforce the Ecuadorian court’s multi-billion dollar 
judgment. 
The district court also looked to independent commentators 
(quoted in the Alvarez Report) as well as other independent 
sources.173  The district concluded that Chevron was likely to prevail 
on the contention that the judgment was rendered in a system that 
“does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with 
the requirements of due process of law,”174 and that it had 
demonstrated serious questions going to the merits of that issue. 
The district court also determined that there was ample evidence 
that the judgment was fraudulent.175   The LAPs had submitted forged 
expert reports; indeed, their counsel ghostwrote much of Cabrera’s 
(the supposed independent expert’s) report and had other improper 
contacts with Cabrera.176   The LAPs did issue “cleansing reports” 
after the improper contacts with Cabrera were revealed.177  Those 
reports, however, substantially relied on Cabrera’s findings, and 
because the judge in Ecuador considered some of the reports in 
issuing the judgment, it would be impossible to separate the tainted 
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report from the final judgment in Ecuador.178  Thus, the Donzinger 
court held that Chevron had raised substantial questions as to 
whether the judgment in Ecuador was a result of fraud.179 
Finally, the Donzinger court held that this case was appropriate for 
declaratory judgment.180  Applying the factors articulated in Dow 
Jones,181 the court held that this was clearly a case of actual 
controversy; the Ecuadorian court had issued a multibillion-dollar 
judgment against Chevron, and the LAPs had specifically articulated 
their intention to enforce that judgment all over the world “as soon as 
possible and certainly no later than when the initial appeal is decided, 
which could occur in a matter of days once the court’s clarifications 
issue.”182 
The court also held that a declaratory judgment would resolve the 
controversy over the judgment’s enforceability, at least within the 
United States and “quite possibly more broadly” (although it did not 
articulate why a declaratory judgment in the United States would 
resolve the controversy “more broadly”). 183  It is important to note 
that the court’s analysis thus far was based upon U.S. law—i.e., 
whether a U.S. court would enforce the judgment.  The court still had 
to make a final jump from why the judgment was unenforceable in 
the United States to asserting that it had the power to bind the 
judgment-creditors from trying to enforce that judgment outside the 
United States.  The Donzinger court noted that because equity acts in 
personam, the court could issue an injunction barring the LAPs from 
enforcing the judgment anywhere in the world without making a 
determination on another court’s sovereignty.184   In other words, the 
district court in Donziger could bind the LAPs without freezing the 
ability of a foreign court system to hear an enforcement proceeding 
because the court had personal jurisdiction over all of the parties. 
Granting the injunction would certainly cause some friction 
between nations, the court acknowledged, but “[w]hen a sovereign 
country renders a judgment and parties attempt to enforce that 
judgment abroad, the fact that the judgment and the forum in which it 
was rendered are open to attack in the forum where enforcement is 
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sought is inherent in the international scheme.”185  The LAPs sought 
to benefit from seeking enforcement in multiple countries, 
presumably to force Chevron into a quick settlement.186  “In this 
circumstance, there is no better remedy because the alternative is 
litigation all over the world, deciding enforceability jurisdiction by 
jurisdiction,” and the evidence raised substantial doubt about the 
fairness of the proceedings in Ecuador.187 
After the Donzinger court established that Chevron would likely 
be able to establish personal jurisdiction over the LAPs,188 it finally 
turned the propriety of issuing an injunction against the LAPs from 
trying to enforce the judgment in foreign jurisdictions while the 
underlying merits of the case were being tried in the Southern District 
of New York.189  The court concluded that the factors articulated in 
China Trade provided the proper standard for determining whether 
the injunction should be granted.190  China Trade has two threshold 
requirements: 1) the parties in the litigation are the same, and 2) 
resolution of the case before the enjoining court should be dispositive 
of the actions to be enjoined in the foreign forum.191  If those 
conditions are met, then the court considers five factors in 
determining whether to issue an injunction: 
1) the frustration of a policy in the enjoining forum; 2) [whether] the 
foreign action would be vexatious; 3) [any] threat to the issuing 
court’s in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction; 4) [whether] the 
proceedings in the other forum prejudice other equitable 
considerations; or 5) [whether] adjudication of the same issues in 
separate actions would result in delay, inconvenience, expense, 
inconsistency, or a race to judgment.192 
The court determined that the first two threshold requirements 
were met, and that the second, fourth, and fifth factors all weighed in 
favor of an injunction.193  It appears that the district court addressed 
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every possible legal standard that could have applied to deciding 
whether to grant anti-“enforcement” actions such as these, which is 
why the Donziger opinion, as well as the Second Circuit opinion 
(which is discussed in the next section) are so interesting—and also 
troublesome. 
B. The Naranjo Decision 
The Second Circuit was probably horrified when the worldwide 
anti-enforcement injunction came up on appeal.  In reversing the 
district court from a unanimous bench, Judge Lynch first discussed 
the standards for review of a preliminary injunction.194  The opinion 
stated that a court of appeals must reverse a district court’s grant of a 
preliminary injunction when there has been an abuse of discretion, or 
if the district court proceeded on the basis of an erroneous 
interpretation of the law.195  Thus, a district court, by applying the 
wrong standard, will have committed an abuse of discretion.196  The 
Second Circuit found that Chevron, and the district court, based the 
anti-enforcement injunction on New York’s codification of the 
Recognition Act.197  The Second Circuit concluded that reliance on 
the Recognition Act was improper, stating that: 
 Whatever the merits of Chevron’s complaints about the 
Ecuadorian courts, however, the procedural device it has chosen to 
present those claims is simply unavoidable: The Recognition Act 
nowhere authorizes a court to declare a foreign judgment 
unenforceable on the preemptive suit of a putative judgment-
debtor . . . .The sections on which Chevron relies provide exceptions 
from the circumstances in which a holder of a foreign judgment can 
obtain enforcement of that judgment in New York; they do not 
create an affirmative cause of action to declare foreign judgments 
void and enjoin their enforcement.198 
The Second Circuit also asserted that the Recognition Act was 
meant “to provide for the enforcement of judgments, not to prevent 
them.”199  The point of the Act, after all, was to facilitate trust 
between nations.200 
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As a result, the Second Circuit focused a great deal on comity 
considerations, stating that issuing such an injunction would violate 
international comity.  New York should not serve as “a transnational 
arbiter” to decide which judgments should be respected and which 
ones should not.201  The court went on to say that even though both 
sides called this injunction an anti-suit injunction, China Trade’s anti-
suit injunction balancing test had “limited relevance” because the 
injunction here was an anti-enforcement injunction.202  Chevron was 
preemptively trying to declare the judgment unenforceable before the 
LAPs tried to enforce it in the Second Circuit, and therefore China 
Trade should not have governed the claim.203 
The court then returned to the principle of international comity.  
Judge Lynch asserted that “when a court in one country attempts to 
preclude the courts of every other nation from ever considering the 
effect of that foreign judgment, the comity concerns become far 
graver.”204  Indeed, it was a “weighty matter” for one judicial system 
to declare another country’s judicial system unfair and corrupt.205  The 
Donzinger court did not discuss the legal rules that would prevent the 
LAPs from enforcing somewhere else.206  Moreover, nothing in the 
Recognition Act allowed a court to enjoin a judgment-creditor from 
enforcing a judgment that was granted in a foreign forum in another 
foreign forum.207 
Finally, the Second Circuit addressed the issue of declaratory 
judgment.  Chevron had also tried to characterize the injunction as a 
simple declaratory judgment under the DJA (confusingly, they had 
tried to argue that the injunction was pursuant to both the DJA and 
China Trade), and by doing so, had “implicitly acknowledge[d] the 
Recognition Act’s limitations . . . .”208  Although district courts have 
discretion to declare legal rights and relations, that discretion must 
rely on a valid legal predicate.209  The court pointed out that like the 
Recognition Act, the DJA is “procedural only,” 210 and “does not 
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create an independent cause of action.”211  Because the Recognition 
Act could not provide a valid legal predicate, the DJA was not 
available to Chevron as a procedural tool.212  Further, while the cases 
referring to the Recognition Act and the DJA together were limited, 
none allowed the DJA to be used to declare the unenforceability of a 
judgment before the judgment-creditor sought to enforce it.213 
The court also referred to Basic v. Fitzroy Engineering, Ltd.214  In 
Basic, a judgment-debtor requested declaratory relief (under the 
DJA) that a foreign judgment was unenforceable.215  The court there 
instructed the plaintiff to pursue an “obvious alternative remedy”216: 
wait until the putative judgment-creditor brought an enforcement 
action under the relevant state’s version of the Recognition act, and 
raise applicable defenses at that time.217  The Naranjo court, 
influenced by the Northern District of Illinois’ analysis in Basic, found 
that the Dow Jones test was of limited relevance, just like China 
Trade.218 
The Second Circuit thus concluded that a “better remedy” was 
indeed available: Chevron could wait until the plaintiffs tried to 
enforce the action in the United States, and then assert its defenses 
under the Recognition Act.219  After all, there was no specific 
indication that the LAPs, although they had indicated an intention to 
enforce the judgment, would choose New York as the place to do so. 
C. Shell Oil 
The Second Circuit, in conducting its analysis, distinguished the 
facts in Chevron from Shell Oil Co. v. Franco, a case that allowed for 
a preemptive declaration under the Recognition Act by a judgment-
debtor.220  Shell Oil is the closest comparable case to the Chevron-
Ecuador litigation—it even involves an oil company and some rogue 
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Central American plaintiffs.  In Shell Oil, a group of Nicaraguan 
plaintiffs had obtained a judgment in Nicaragua for exposure to 
DBCP, a nematocide used to control infestation of crops.221  The 
plaintiffs filed suit in Nicaragua for damages from exposure to 
DBCP.222  The Nicaraguan claimants (Claimants) obtained a $489.4 
million judgment against four companies, one of which was Shell 
Oil.223  The Claimants tried to enforce the judgment in the Central 
District of California against all four defendants.224  The Claimants 
accidentally, however, named “Shell Chemical Company” as a 
defendant instead of Shell Oil Company, which the Claimants 
conceded and dismissed on appeal.225  Shell Oil then filed an action 
for declaratory relief in the Central District of California, seeking a 
declaration that the Nicaraguan judgment was unenforceable.226 
The California district court first addressed whether Shell Oil’s 
action was ripe.  In determining ripeness, the court concluded that 
there was a substantial controversy between the parties.227  The 
Claimants had obtained a multimillion-dollar judgment against Shell 
Oil in Nicaragua, and had made it clear that they were going to 
enforce the judgment from their initial attempt to do so in the same 
jurisdiction.228  There was every reason to believe that they would 
attempt to enforce the judgment now that they had realized their 
mistake.229  Next, the court analyzed whether the Nicaraguan 
judgment was enforceable in California.230  The district court 
concluded that, under California’s codification of the Recognition Act 
and relevant standards for summary judgment, the Nicaraguan court 
lacked personal jurisdiction over Shell Oil (one of the grounds for 
non-recognition)231 and there was no genuine issue of material fact 
remaining to be decided.232  Thus, a declaratory judgment that the 
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Nicaraguan judgment was unenforceable in the United States was 
proper.233 
The Second Circuit, however, distinguished Shell Oil because 
unlike the Nicaraguan Claimants, the LAPs had not yet tried to 
enforce the Ecuadorian judgment in New York.  Despite some 
ambiguity in the California district court’s reasoning, the Second 
Circuit stated “to the extent that Shell [Oil] stands for the proposition 
that the Recognition Act can be used by judgment-debtors as a 
procedural lever to seek affirmative invalidation of foreign judgments 
before their enforcement is sought, we decline to follow it.”234 
D. Ripeness and Libel Tourism 
While the Central District of California in Shell Oil considered 
whether a money judgment-debtor could bring an affirmative action 
in the United States before the judgment-creditor had technically 
tried to enforce the judgment,235 the Ninth Circuit examined the 
ripeness issue with regard to non-money judgments.   In Yahoo! Inc. 
v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme (Yahoo! III), eight 
judges out of a divided en banc court discussed a preemptive suit for 
non-enforceability under the First Amendment of a French court’s 
judgment.236  The underlying action involved the organizations La 
Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme (LICRA) and L’Union 
des Etudiants Juifs de France (UEJF), which sued Yahoo!, an 
Internet service provider, for making available to French citizens 
various websites selling Nazi paraphernalia and displaying Nazi 
symbols in violation of French law.237  The French court issued an 
interim order, requiring Yahoo! to take the websites down or block 
French access to those sites.238  Yahoo! objected, and responded that 
there was no technical solution to that order.239  The company filed 
suit against LICRA in California federal district court, seeking a 
declaration that the interim orders were not recognizable or 
enforceable in the United States.240  The district court held that it had 
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personal jurisdiction over LICRA and UEJF, denying their motion to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.241  Several months later, in 
another “thoughtful opinion,” as described by the Ninth Circuit,242 the 
district court concluded that the suit was ripe, that abstention was not 
warranted, and that “the First Amendment precludes enforcement 
within the United States.”243 
In an incredibly fractured en banc opinion, the Ninth Circuit 
majority reversed the district court.  The majority found that the 
district court did have personal jurisdiction over LICRA and UEJF.244  
Of that majority, three judges wanted to dismiss the case for lack of 
ripeness, and five judges concluded that the case was ripe for 
adjudication under the requirements articulated in Abbott 
Laboratories.245  In applying the two-part Abbott Laboratories test, 
the three judges who wished to dismiss the case for lack of ripeness 
looked at the precise legal question to be answered in applying the 
fitness for judicial resolution prong from Abbott Laboratories, as well 
as the factual record.246  They concluded that there was no federal 
statute on the recognition of foreign-country judgments, and that 
California’s version of the Recognition Act did not cover 
injunctions.247  Thus, the judges felt compelled to consider 
international comity, and the general principle followed by California 
courts that an American court will not enforce a foreign judgment if 
that judgment is “repugnant to the public policy of the United 
States . . . .”248   
It was difficult to tell, however, whether the French judgment 
would be repugnant to the public policy of the United States—adding 
to the prematurity and speculative nature of the suit.  The three 
judges further noted that it was unclear whether, or exactly how, 
Yahoo! had complied with the French court’s orders, which would be 
highly relevant to whether enforcement of the judgment would be 
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 242. See Yahoo! III, 433 F.3d at 1204 (en banc). 
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repugnant to public policy.249  “Without a finding that further 
compliance with the French court’s orders would necessarily result in 
restrictions on access by users in the United States,” the court 
reasoned, “the only question in this case is whether California public 
policy and the First Amendment require unrestricted access by 
Internet users in France.  In other words, the only question would 
involve a determination of whether the First Amendment has 
extraterritorial application,”250 the extent of which was very unclear.  
Thus, the question was not fit for judicial resolution. 
Turning to the hardship of the parties, the three judges concluded 
that “[t]he core of Yahoo!’s hardship argument may thus be that it 
has a First Amendment interest in allowing access by users in 
France.”251  However, as was discussed in the fitness for judicial 
resolution prong, the existence of a right to extraterritorially apply 
U.S. constitutional rights to free speech was not clear.  The judges 
found that because it was incredibly unlikely that any monetary 
penalty could actually be enforced against Yahoo!, and because the 
extent to which Yahoo! would have to restrict American users was 
quite speculative, the level of harm was not sufficient to render the 
suit ripe.252   
The Yahoo! III court eventually decided to dismiss the case, even 
though the opinion addressing the ripeness issue was written by just 
three judges.253  Indeed, “[w]hen the votes of the three judges who 
conclude that the suit is unripe are combined with the votes of the 
three dissenting judges who conclude that there is no personal 
jurisdiction over LICRA and UEJF, there are six votes to dismiss 
Yahoo!’s suit.”254  Still, the question remains whether Chevron’s suit 
and its request for an anti-enforcement injunction should have been 
analyzed within the context of the two-part Abbott Labs test. 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
The Second Circuit’s decision in Naranjo still leaves some 
unanswered questions and unsettled law.  As a case study, it is a 
wonderful example of the complexities and ironies that accompany 
international litigation.  But for practitioners, it creates a number of 
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procedural hurdles to overcome when combating aggressive 
multinational enforcement proceedings. 
Practically speaking, it is clear that even if the LAPs tried to 
enforce the Ecuadorian judgment in the United States, it would 
probably be unenforceable in any state that has codified a version of 
the Recognition Act.255  The Guerra report states that the LAPs’ 
attorneys ghostwrote the Ecuadorian court’s multibillion-dollar 
judgment.256  It has been suggested that transnational tort cases in 
particular are susceptible to litigation impropriety,257 and the 
Chevron-Ecuador litigation is a good illustration of that observation. 
Chevron was asking for an unusual injunction.  Indeed, the 
Naranjo and Donziger opinions indicate that the courts in those cases 
were not sure how to address the issue because they applied multiple 
legal analyses: the DJA,258 the Recognition Act, and the applicable 
standards in New York for granting anti-suit injunctions.259  
Moreover, other cases evaluating preemptive suits for non-
enforcement have addressed whether the action is ripe pursuant to 
Article III of the federal Constitution—mostly in the context of libel 
tourism.260  The various problems with the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Naranjo and the Southern District of New York’s in Donziger (Parts 
IV.A and IV.B) are discussed in turn.  Part IV.C discusses whether a 
ripeness analysis is relevant, and if so, whether that conclusion has 
any bearing on the underlying problem of aggressive multinational 
enforcement proceedings.  Part IV.D discusses alternative approaches 
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and proposes a solution that would involve crafting a new injunction 
using a modified anti-suit injunction analysis.  
A. Problems with the Naranjo Decision 
The Second Circuit’s decision that courts should dismiss a motion 
for a preliminary anti-enforcement injunction because the 
Recognition Act applies—and not the standards for granting anti-suit 
injunctions—is problematic from both a legal and policy standpoint. 
The Naranjo court held that N.Y. C.P.L.R. Article 53 (New York’s 
version of the Recognition Act) was unavailable to Chevron due to a 
procedural restriction: Article 53 provides defenses to recognition and 
cannot act as an affirmative cause of action.261  Assuming the Second 
Circuit was correct, China Trade is indeed of “limited relevance.”262  
Instead, the Recognition Act applies, but cannot provide a basis for 
non-liability standing alone.263 
Although the Second Circuit was able to shed some light on how to 
interpret the Recognition Act—at least within the Second Circuit, if 
not other Circuits—the opinion poses several problems as a matter of 
law and policy.  The Naranjo decision provides judgment-creditors 
who have potentially unfair judgments in hand with a roadmap, 
telling them precisely what to do if they want to enforce a judgment 
that would not pass muster in the United States.  To make sure the 
judgment-debtor has no remedy from defending in multiple fora, 
judgment-creditors must simply avoid the United States, and proceed 
in countries where the defendant has assets and the local justice 
system would be less squeamish about recognizing a questionable 
award.  This roadmap effectively leads to a form of harassment, 
creating the kind of vexatious proceedings that the anti-suit injunction 
standards arguably exist to prevent.264  It is a strange case where the 
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China Trade factors seem like they should apply, but do not because 
there is not yet an enforcement proceeding in the United States. 
Although the factors for granting anti-suit injunctions seem to 
mirror Chevron’s situation, the Second Circuit was probably right 
that China Trade and its progeny were of limited relevance.  The very 
wording of the China Trade test indicates that it applies only to 
parallel proceedings—i.e., to multiple proceedings that have already 
begun.265  Here, when the injunction was originally sought, the LAPs 
had not commenced any enforcement proceedings (they merely 
threatened to begin them).266  Moreover, a threshold requirement of 
China Trade requires that resolution of the case in the enjoining 
forum would be dispositive of the actions enjoined in the foreign 
forum.267  Is New York judgment recognition law dispositive of 
proceedings in Canada, for example?  Or Argentina?  The answer is 
most likely no. 
Another question raised by the Naranjo opinion is whether the 
picture changed after enforcement proceedings commenced in other 
countries.  Would the Second Circuit have affirmed the district court’s 
injunction in Donziger if the proceedings in Brazil or Canada or 
Argentina had already begun when the district court issued its 
opinion?  The answer, arguably, is that while it may have had some 
bearing on the Second Circuit’s decision in Naranjo (which is 
unlikely, considering how concerned the Second Circuit was about 
international comity), it would not have made any difference to the 
overarching problem discussed in this Note.  Particularly because the 
Second Circuit’s solution for Chevron was to wait to assert the 
Recognition Act’s defenses for when the judgment-creditor brought 
an enforcement proceeding in the United States, the fact that 
proceedings had begun in another country makes no difference.  An 
enforcement proceeding still has not occurred in the United States, 
and therefore the Recognition Act provides no relief.  In future cases, 
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the judgment-debtor will still be forced to defend in multiple 
countries and hope that some kind of enforcement proceeding will be 
filed in the United States, allowing the judgment-debtor to utilize the 
Recognition Act’s defenses. 
Nevertheless, these issues do not mean that China Trade is 
completely irrelevant.  The LAPs have tried to bring identical 
enforcement proceedings in multiple fora outside the United States.268  
The proceedings are oppressive and vexatious.  The situation looks 
like something that should be evaluated under China Trade, but it 
technically cannot apply because there is no parallel proceeding in the 
United States.  Even at the time Naranjo was decided, none of the 
enforcement actions had begun.  Chevron was still appealing the 
judgment in Ecuador, although the LAPs were planning on trying to 
enforce the judgment in multiple fora before those proceedings were 
complete.269 
The issue of the DJA is slightly more nuanced.  Shell Oil, which 
was discussed in Naranjo, involved a declaration of non-enforceability 
within the United States.  In issuing declaratory judgment, the court 
in Shell Oil determined that a Nicaraguan judgment would be 
unenforceable in the United States because it was unenforceable 
under California’s version of the Recognition Act.270  Thus, the DJA 
could have at least provided a remedy within the United States.  
Parties bring declarations of non-liability all the time, and there is no 
reason why the district court could not have declared the judgment 
unenforceable in the United States, like the court did in Shell Oil.  
The court in Donziger, however, was deciding not whether to grant a 
motion for declaratory judgment, but rather, whether to issue a 
preliminary anti-enforcement injunction.271  The opinion was unclear 
about what standard applied because such an injunction had never 
been issued before.  Regardless, looking to the Recognition Act in 
determining whether to issue a declaratory judgment worldwide is not 
a proper remedy, because U.S. law cannot determine a judgment’s 
enforceability in another country’s legal system without violating 
international comity.272 
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B. Problems with the Donziger Decision 
The Donziger opinion presents a set of problems separate from the 
Naranjo opinion as a matter of both law and policy.  Legally speaking, 
although the Donziger court raised a number of good arguments for 
why the harm would be irreparable and why the foreign proceedings 
were vexatious, it simply lacked the procedural device with which to 
attach the injunction.  As mentioned previously, the Second Circuit 
was probably correct that the Recognition Act, on its own, cannot 
provide a basis for non-liability.273  The anti-suit injunction test is only 
applicable to existing parallel proceedings. 
The DJA, however, is an equally unsatisfying solution for a 
judgment-debtor in Chevron’s position.  The DJA is procedural only, 
and as with the Recognition Act, courts must reference substantive 
law when issuing a declaratory judgment.274  The district court in 
Donziger was essentially grasping for a procedural hook that it felt 
must exist, but instead found a variety of arguments that were all 
insufficient. 
Although courts should be able to issue declaratory judgments on 
enforceability within the United States, it is unlikely that a court 
would be able to declare a foreign judgment unenforceable anywhere 
in the world.275  Nevertheless, the reason the judge in Donziger had no 
qualms with issuing an anti-enforcement injunction as far as comity 
was concerned was because the injunction was binding on the parties, 
and not foreign court systems.276  It was also a preliminary injunction, 
meant to stop the LAPs from enforcing the judgment until a trial on 
the merits could be held.277  The injunction was not necessarily 
intended to be a permanent one, declaring that the entire world must 
adhere to U.S. judgment recognition law.  There was substantial 
evidence of fraudulent proceedings in Ecuador and evidence that the 
LAPs had manipulated those proceedings.278  Perhaps the Second 
                                                                                                                             
causes of action by which disappointed litigants in foreign cases can ask a New York 
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 277. Id. at 594. 
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Circuit was understating its ability to do anything for Chevron—but 
again, if the procedural device does not exist, no amount of policy will 
help a judgment-debtor. 
Another potential issue with the Donziger decision is the 
possibility that such an injunction is too protective of U.S. litigants.  
What interest does the Southern District of New York have in 
preventing Chevron from being forced to litigate all over the world, 
other than the fact that Chevron is based in the United States?  
Would this be a form of protective jurisdiction?  Although anti-suit 
injunctions, for example, are already a form of protective judicial 
procedures,279 it is arguably not a U.S. court’s responsibility to protect 
judgment-debtors like Chevron from abusive multinational 
litigation—unless the judgment contradicts a strongly-held public 
policy of the forum.  Perhaps defending in multiple fora is simply the 
price a large company pays for doing business in countries where 
notions of constitutionally required due process do not necessarily 
exist.  That argument, combined with the international comity 
concerns (the idea that issuing such an injunction would fail to accord 
the respect that a foreign court system deserves280), makes the 
feasibility of such an injunction look very weak. 
C. The Ripeness Analysis 
As far as ripeness goes, even if ripeness is what courts should be 
evaluating, then the Recognition Act/China Trade/DJA discussion is 
still pertinent.  The court in Yahoo! III281 noted that when reviewing 
the first prong of the Abbott Labs test, courts generally look to both 
the facts of the case and the substantive legal issue at hand.282  
Whether a court may attach an anti-enforcement injunction to the 
Recognition Act certainly speaks to the question of whether the issue 
is fit for judicial resolution, which essentially leads us down the same 
road travelled by the court in Naranjo.  If the Recognition Act is 
unavailable as a procedural remedy to justify an anti-enforcement 
injunction, then the action cannot be fit for judicial resolution until 
the judgment-creditors have tried to enforce the judgment in the 
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United States.  In effect, the circle comes back to the problems and 
questions raised by the Naranjo decision discussed in Part IV.A.  
Thus, addressing the ripeness question does not lead to any real, final 
conclusions for the purposes of this Note’s overarching question.  
Instead, adding a ripeness layer to the inquiry will merely add to the 
procedural difficulties a litigant will face when requesting an anti-
enforcement injunction. 
D. So, What is the Remedy? 
The question now, of course (after the various arguments used in 
Donziger and Naranjo have been ruled out), is how can the problem 
be solved?  What tools are left for a court to use when a judgment-
debtor is faced with multiple proceedings in different countries to 
enforce an allegedly unfair foreign judgment? 
A principal problem in international litigation is the lack of a set 
standard for cases such as these.  Chevron was certainly asking for 
something unusual.  As the Second Circuit noted, Shell Oil was the 
closest comparison, and in Shell Oil the motion for declaratory 
judgment was granted primarily because the judgment-creditors 
previously tried to enforce the judgment, but had named the wrong 
defendant.283  The Naranjo opinion is also the only opinion that refers 
to the legality of an “anti-enforcement injunction” in this situation.284  
Nonetheless, the fact that the courts in Donziger and Naranjo refer to 
multiple lines of legal analysis in their struggle to find an answer to 
this problem indicates how complicated international litigation 
proceedings can be. 
International law, as a general matter, does not provide any 
remedy for abusive enforcement proceedings either.  The United 
States is not subject to any treaty on recognition of judgments,285 and 
thus no law exists (at least, no law that is binding in the United States) 
on multiple enforcement proceedings and whether they can be 
stopped or consolidated in some way.  There the anti-suit injunction 
standards present additional issues.  The conservative side of the anti-
suit injunction Circuit split requires that parallel proceedings should 
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generally be allowed to continue,286 which arguably leads to a “race to 
judgment.”287  Perhaps the anti-suit injunction standards are no longer 
helpful in a world where parallel proceedings are common and every 
international dispute is consumed with a plethora of procedural 
issues. 
As a policy matter (and pointing to the political undertones of the 
Chevron-Ecuador litigation), there are certainly plenty of academics 
and environmental groups who support the LAPs’ cause.288  Aside 
from anger at the allegations of environmental damage, some 
organizations have gone so far as to say that the damage in Ecuador 
rises to the level of human rights abuses.289  On the other hand, this 
particular method of retribution for Chevron’s alleged wrongdoing is 
a bit unconventional.  The LAPs’ allegations deal with land and 
environmental abuses, implying that the ROE should be bringing this 
action against Chevron (if Chevron should be held liable).  Notably, 
the ROE had already settled claims with Texaco before Chevron’s 
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involvement.290  Thus, the situation raises the additional underlying 
question of whether attorneys like Steven Donziger (particularly in 
light of Alberto Guerra’s sworn affidavit291) are taking advantage of 
litigants like the LAPs, using the cloak of moral justice to hopefully 
obtain a contingency fee at the end of the road.292  Should lawyers be 
allowed to use multiple enforcement proceedings in this way? 
Both practically and procedurally, the DJA, China Trade, and the 
Recognition Act are all insufficient, standing alone, to provide some a 
remedy for aggressive multinational proceedings to enforce an 
apparently unfair judgment.  Each argument has its own weaknesses, 
which is probably why Chevron attempted to make all of them, and 
why the Second Circuit was able to dismiss each in turn.  But, as 
unique as the Chevron-Ecuador litigation may be, in a world of 
increasing multinational litigation, aggressive and almost harassing 
enforcement proceedings are not likely to disappear.  So what can 
litigants and courts do besides spend a great deal of time talking 
about international comity?  After all, courts on both sides of the 
anti-suit injunction split agree that “comity” is an “elusive concept” 
and not easily defined.293  It is simple enough to talk about the respect 
a court should accord to the legal systems of a foreign nation, but it is 
quite another task (and a much more difficult one) for courts to 
articulate a clear standard when actually applying comity to the facts 
of a specific case.294 
To name one attempted solution, judgment-debtors who feel 
victimized by an unfair judgment could do what Chevron tried to do 
in a later action, which was to find a way to obtain specific jurisdiction 
over each judgment-creditor individually, and bring all of the parties 
together in a single suit.295  Then, the court could find something to 
which to attach an injunction.  In Chevron’s case, Chevron could use 
the claims brought under RICO, arguing for the injunction based on a 
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common law theory of unjust enrichment—and Chevron has actually 
tried to make this argument.296  The unjust enrichment claim was 
deemed unripe, however, because the judgment-creditors had not yet 
collected on the judgment anywhere inside or outside the United 
States.297  Under New York law, a judgment does not create any 
vested property interest.298  Thus, one remedy (albeit an unpalatable 
one) would have been to wait until the LAPs collected part of the 
judgment in another forum, and then enjoin them from collecting the 
rest.  That “remedy,” however, would still require Chevron to appear 
and defend in those jurisdictions, so it does not solve the overarching 
problem put forth in this Note.  Chevron would also have to deliver 
part of the judgment, which would only be recovered if the district 
court awarded damages for the unjust enrichment claim. 
The best solution is to create a new standard—but not one 
completely unknown.  The federal Circuits should fashion a new type 
of injunction based on the China Trade factors, requiring that the 
U.S. court have personal jurisdiction over all of the parties through an 
underlying claim, such as in the RICO action mentioned above.  
Academics have suggested that anti-suit injunctions should be issued 
when the foreign action is interdictory in nature,299 which certainly 
applies here, so it makes sense to adopt a modified China Trade test 
to anti-enforcement injunctions, particularly when abuse of 
enforcement proceedings appear imminent. 
																																																																																																																																
 296. See id.  In that action (not to be confused with the preliminary injunction 
action of the same name), Chevron’s claims included: 
[A]ssertions that Steven Donziger, a New York lawyer, and others based in 
the United States, here conceived, substantially executed, largely funded, 
and significantly directed a scheme to extort and defraud Chevron, a U.S. 
company, by, among other things, (1) bringing a baseless lawsuit in 
Ecuador; (2) fabricating (principally in the United States) evidence for use 
in that lawsuit in order to obtain an unwarranted judgment there; (3) 
exerting pressure on Chevron to coerce it to pay money not only by means 
of the Ecuadorian litigation and Judgment, but also by subjecting Chevron 
to public attacks in the United States and elsewhere based on false and 
misleading statements, (4) inducing U.S. public officials to investigate 
Chevron on the basis of false claims, and (5) making false statements to U.S. 
courts and intimidating and tampering with witnesses in U.S. court 
proceedings to prevent Chevron from obtaining evidence of the fraud. 
Id. at 236–37.  Chevron’s complaint stated nine causes of action, including substantive 
and conspiracy claims under RICO, common law tort claims, unjust enrichment, and 
state law civil conspiracy claims. Id. at 237. 
 297. Id. at 259. 
 298. See id. at 259–60 (citing In re Calloway, 423 B.R. 627, 629–30 (Bankr. 
W.D.N.Y. 2010)). 
 299. See generally Heiser, supra note 2 (also arguing that anti-suit injunctions 
should be granted to enforce choice of court agreements). 
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When deciding whether to grant an anti-enforcement injunction 
(notwithstanding whether enforcement proceedings have begun in the 
United States), courts should, as a threshold matter, determine (1) 
whether personal jurisdiction exists over all the parties, and (2) 
whether the U.S. court has a substantial interest in resolving the 
dispute.  The second threshold prong will exist to prevent courts from 
issuing anti-enforcement injunctions when the United States has little 
or nothing to do with the case.  In the Chevron-Ecuador litigation, for 
example, the Southern District of New York served as the forum for 
an earlier tort action brought by the LAPs (then called the “Aguinda 
plaintiffs”) that was dismissed for forum non conveniens.300  More 
importantly, the Southern District of New York was also the forum 
for the underlying RICO action to which the court in Donziger sought 
to attach the anti-enforcement injunction.301  To satisfy the second 
threshold requirement, the litigation as a whole must therefore have 
some contact with the United States.  Mere fortuitous jurisdiction 
over the parties (if the LAPs happened to be domiciled in New York) 
is not enough.  The injunction also may not be attached to a separate 
and completely unrelated suit. 
Next, if both threshold prongs are met, courts should consider 
whether (a) the enforcement proceedings are likely to occur or have 
occurred already, (b) the judgment would be unenforceable in the 
United States based on U.S. recognition law, (c) the judgment-debtor 
would suffer irreparable harm from those proceedings, and (d) the 
multi-forum enforcement proceedings violate public policy.  Naturally 
the factors are likely to overlap, and the circumstances in which such 
a test is likely to be applied are quite narrow.  However, the 
narrowness of this test should hopefully assuage the concerns of those 
who are already uncomfortable with issuing anti-suit injunctions. 
CONCLUSION: THE AFTERMATH OF NARANJO 
Since the Guerra affidavit was released, the LAPs’ case has 
become essentially worthless to Donziger.  Chevron has sued various 
persons and entities associated with the LAPs’ case, including Patton 
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Boggs, L.L.P., a large law firm based in Washington, D.C.302  Patton 
Boggs had joined Donziger in the suit against Chevron on a partial 
contingency basis in 2010.303  Chevron’s specific claim against Patton 
Boggs is for fraud and malicious prosecution during the course of the 
litigation.304 
Chevron has also convinced multiple parties to renounce Donziger 
and “admit” that the proceedings in Ecuador were fraudulent in 
exchange for being dropped from Chevron’s RICO suit.305  Even 
before Chevron sued Patton Boggs, Buford Capital—the publicly 
traded fund that financed Patton Boggs’ representation—stated that 
Patton Boggs had given them a misleading analysis of the case.306  
Stratus Consulting (the company Donziger hired to comment on the 
expert report in Ecuador) has recanted its scientific findings and 
conclusions in exchange for being dropped from the racketeering suit 
as well.307  Finally, a Canadian court has dismissed one of the LAPs’ 
enforcement actions, mostly because Chevron has no assets in 
Ontario.308 
Again, plenty of environmentalists and academics would like to see 
Chevron pay for its wrongdoing in the Amazon, regardless of the 
lengths taken to achieve that payment.  The litigation, however, has 
become entirely unmanageable.  Multiple firms on the case have 
asked to withdraw, and one such firm has noted poetically that due to 
Chevron’s army of lawyers, the case has “degenerated into a 
Dickensian farce.”309 
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The way the Chevron-Ecuador story has unfolded begs the 
question of how much time and money was spent at the expense of so 
many individuals and entities—all in an attempt to take advantage of 
a polluted rainforest and its inhabitants.  Given that there is little 
remedy in international law and a similar pattern of litigation is 
bound to happen again, federal courts should adopt a new test for 
issuing anti-enforcement injunctions to prevent aggressive, 
multinational enforcement proceedings when the above-described 
factors are met.  Such a test would create a balance between 
international comity concerns and the interest in both preventing 
proceedings to enforce a fraudulent judgment from occurring and 
providing an avenue for judgment-debtors to pursue when they are, 
or may become, subject to such proceedings. 
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